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MASTERS IN FINANCE 
EQUITY RESEARCH 
 
 Exhibiting commercial momentum – NOS added 138k 
mobile users in 3Q14 vs. 100k the previous quarter and also 
reduced Pay TV losses from 22.7k in 2Q14 to only 8.9k this 
quarter, despite Vodafone’s aggressive pricing, which I show to be 
unfeasible 
 Growing in a €2bn corporate market – NOS has won in 
the past months flagship large corporate accounts from the market 
incumbent like CGD and BPI, but it can keep building that backlog 
further as an integrated player in a segment where it only had 15% 
market share as of 2013 
 Potential for substantial shareholder remuneration – 
with no significant M&A in sight, there is potential to pay-out €0.27 
per share in dividends (6% dividend yield) without breaking the 
2.0x Net Debt/EBITDA barrier in 2016 
 Refinancing deals as a catalyst – by placing privately 
€275m in bonds, NOS reduced its average cost of debt by 50bp in 
just 9 months. With €327m in debt maturing in 2015, the 




NOS is a cable and telecommunications company that offers Pay-
Tv, broadband, fixed voice and mobile services in the Portuguese 
market. Its activities also include the cinema distribution and 
exhibition as well as content creation and sale through NOS-
owned Pay-Tv channels. 
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I initiate coverage of NOS SGPS with a BUY recommendation and a fair value of 
6.46€, including a cash in from dividends in 2015, with a 30.5% upside to its 
current price of €4.95, as of January 6th. 
 
Since the Zon-Optimus merger, NOS became a fully integrated player in the 
Portuguese Telecommunications market, offering services of broadband, fixed 
voice, Pay TV and mobile both separated and in a convergent manner. NOS has 
shown significant commercial momentum in recent quarters, both illustrated by 
increasing its market share in the mobile sector, adding over 138k subscribers in 
3Q14 but also by losing Pay TV customers in a gradually slower rate.  
 
My view is that if NOS displays this commercial strength when in a context where 
there is Vodafone’s very aggressive pricing – 3P bundle at €24.99 a month for 2 
years – then there is great potential for NOS to up-scale even more of its wide 
base of Pay TV customers to higher value bundles that include broadband and 
mobile as well, when the competitive landscape smoothens. I am confident that 
Vodafone will ease its pricing policy after 2015 on back of two main reasons. 
Firstly, Altice winning bid will make the market shift from 4 players to only 3, thus 
diminishing competitive pressure. Secondly, I show below that network and 
programming costs alone make Vodafone lose money on each customer it adds 
at its current price of €24.99, be it through satellite or fibre. 
 
Lastly, I consider that given the consolidated picture of the Portuguese Telco 
market going forward and the statement by NOS management that it’s not in their 
objectives to spend further money in Africa through ZAP or any other player, than 
the cash flow generated will not be used to pursue any major M&A activity. Thus, 
the cash will most likely be distributed to shareholders. NOS could distribute up to 
€0.27/share in dividends in 2016 without breaking the 2x Net Debt/EBITDA 
barrier, thus maintain a stable level of leverage. 
 
Another reason I am bullish on the stock, is that NOS is showing ability to finance 
itself at lower cost, decreasing its 50bp in a 9 month period only on 2 refinancing 
operations amounting to €275m. With €325m bonds and loans maturing 
throughout 2015, refinancing deals will likely constitute a positive catalyst for the 
shares, as debt becomes more likely to be repaid. Also, a lower cost of debt is 
supportive of my hypothesis of a high shareholder remuneration going forward.
 
 









The valuation method used was a Sum-of-Parts valuation, valuing separately NOS’ 
operations and its 30% stake in ZAP. Both parts were valuated using a Discounted Cash 
Flows Model. Under this methodology I reached the target price of €6.46, and accordingly I 
have a BUY recommendation for the stock, with a 31.5% upside to be materialized by the 
end of 2015. Note however that this target price does include the expected cash-in from a 
dividend payment to occur in 2015 as well as a probability weighted scenario analysis. 
 
Main Assumptions 
My DCF valuation is subject to be discounted at the weighted average cost of capital, under 
the current market weights of debt and equity in the firm, respectively 30% and 70%. In 
order to obtain the expected return on these two sources of capital I will use a CAPM 
approach, and all the accordingly needed inputs. 
 
Starting with risk-free, although the 10y German Bund yield is usually used as a proxy for a 
risk-free long-term investment in Europe, I believe today’s environment of unprecedentedly 
low interest rates biases down that rate considerably, as it currently stands at 0.9%, and 
three/four years for now that will no longer hold. So, as rates go up a couple of years from 
now I would end up with a very ill representation of a risk-free investment for the major part 
of the time frame involved in my valuation, as I likely could re-invest without risk again at a 
higher rate, 10 years from now. Given this unprecedented low-rate period we are currently 
in, I took instead the last ten year average of that same 10y German Bund yield, which 
generated a risk-free rate of 2.6%. Alternatively, I could have used the current yield on the 
30y German Bund as the risk-free rate, 1.32%1 on my model. However, that rate has 
considerably lower trade volumes, making it less liquid and therefore a poorer choice as a 
proxy for the risk-free rate. Hence, despite using the last ten year average of the weekly 10y 
German bund yields as the risk-free rate in my base case scenario, I acknowledge the 
possibility of using the alternatives in the table to the left, by matching separately each risk-
free rate hypothesis with the corresponding discount rate.  
 
Also, by regressing the returns of NOS on the MSCI World Index I obtained a Beta on the 
stock of 0.90 for the last 3 years. Notice that prior to the NOS stock, I am taking the ZONOP 
and prior to the merger the ZON Multimédia stock, as considering only the company after 
the merger effectively translated into a new stock would be too few observations, thus 
yielding a statistically non-robust Beta.  Alternatively, I looked at the Beta of comparables in 
the Portuguese market, Portugal Telecom and Sonaecom. Their Betas against the MSCI 
World Index were 1.21 and 0.84, respectively. However, I have chosen not to factor in this 
Betas in my cost of equity calculation for NOS. This is because both companies’ excess 
returns in the later stages of my samples have very little to do with the perceived risk NOS 
will have going forward as a cable/telecom carrier company in Portugal – Portugal Telecom 
                                                     
1 As of January 2nd, 2015 
        Table 1 – Risk-free rates 
and the correspondent WACC 
(%) 
Risk-free WACC
Base Case Scenario 2.63% 8.70%
Current 10Y Bund Yield 0.50% 4.98%
Current 30y Bund Yield 1.32% 6.42%
Source: NOVASBE Research; 
Bloomberg 












listed in the PSI20 since the Oi-PT merger is a holding-like company that holds 25.6% of Oi. 
The behaviour of its price is driven by Oi’s performance (thus tied with Brazilian telecom 
market) and more importantly by evolution of bid’s made by Mrs. Isabel dos Santos. As for 
Sonaecom, once the owner of Optimus which is now a part of NOS, ever since the merger 
took place is a company much more directed at the IT consulting and media publishing 
businesses. Thus, both cases would fare a poorer estimation of NOS’ systematic risk. 
Considering the historical market risk premium since 1946 according to Siegel (2005) of 
6.27%, I obtained a cost of equity of 8.38%.  
 
As for the cost of debt, I started off by estimating a credit rating for NOS through Moody’s 
credit rating methodology for the telecommunications industry2 and applied to NOS, as NOS 
does have public trading bonds but not only are they a scarce sample (only two bonds), they 
are also not graded by any credit rating agency. My estimations yielded a rating of Baa3 (the 
lowest of investment-grades, equivalent to BBB- on S&P’s scale). However, as NOS’ cash 
flows are generated in excess of 90% in Portugal, they are undoubtedly subject to a 
sovereign risk as well, that is not entirely taken into account in Moody’s methodology3. Thus, 
by equalling weighing NOS’ estimate and the Portuguese Sovereign credit rating (Ba1), I 
obtained NOS overall credit rating of Ba1, the first grade to fall under the non-investment 
category. Then I associate the credit rating with the average market implied credit spread on 
the Ba1 rating, 3%. The rating is also associated with an historic probability of default 
(0.67%4) that I equally weight against the European telecommunication industry default rate 
forecasted for 2014 by Moody’s (0.9%4). Considering also Moody’s historical recovery rates 
by debt types, I get an overall amount-weighted recovery rate of 66.3%. Adding that to the 
risk-free stated above (2.62%), I arrived at a cost of debt of 5.61%, which consequently 
yields a WACC of 8.70%. The inputs taken for the WACC are stated on the table to the left. 






                                                     
2 Moody’s Investor Service (2010) Rating Methodology - Global Telecommunications Industry 
3 Moody’s factors for the estimation of NOS’ credit rating and the score attributed to those same factors are detailed 
in the appendix 
4 Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2013, Moody’s 
Table 2 – Inputs for the WACC 
Risk-free 2.63%
Beta 0.905






Source: NOVASBE Research 
 
Table 3 – NOS Forecasted Cash-Flows (Under Base Case Scenario) in €000’ 
Source: NOVASBE Research 
FCF 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
EBIT 228,963 247,172 278,157 332,116 367,895 402,377
Income Tax -68,689 -74,152 -83,447 -99,635 -110,369 -120,713
Tax Adjustment 13,814 15,185 17,605 21,881 24,704 27,446
NOPLAT 174,087 188,206 212,315 254,363 282,231 309,110
Depreciation 336,154 335,807 325,243 313,271 303,085 295,896
Gross Operating CF 510,241 524,013 537,558 567,633 585,316 605,006
NWC requirements -34,684 -616 -334 -1,083 -1,166 -1,244
CAPEX -2325 -70807 -80243 -68271 -48188 -50896
FCF 113,629 258,396 292,224 321,550 329,253 358,761
 
 



















Regarding the Terminal Value, I project the free cash flow generated in perpetuity, growing 
at my estimated long-term sustainable growth rate g. The long-term growth rate I have 
chosen is 1.5%. I have chosen this growth rate as I believe in a country like Portugal with 
very modest growth expectations going forward, even if I would take the expected long-term 
inflation rate to be maintained by the ECB at 2%, that would still represent an 
overestimation, since the Telcom market overall is a declining market as I show in the 
“Market Overview” section of this report. Ultimately, I do not believe Portugal will keep the 
inflation rate in-line with the Euro-zone as whole, as it has been the case recently. Notice I 
have left out the sustainable growth rate. This is mostly because, historical speaking the 
sustainable growth rate for telecom companies in Portugal has not been a good proxy for 
their ability to growth in the very long-term (as they should grow the least at inflation 
forecasted for the following periods), as shown by the erratic top line illustrated on the left. 
Also, looking at the ROIC of Portuguese competitors, we can confirm that NOS (former ZON 
and ZONOP) has had for most years the superior ROIC. This is particular relevant to ensure 
value creation in the perpetuity (growing at least at the inflation rate) – ROIC is more resilient 
than growth. Thus, since NOS exhibits higher ROIC than its peers, it is more likely to create 
value in the long-term than they are.5  
 
 As for the Terminal Value cash flow per say, I firstly I make the revenues from the last   
projected year 2023 grow at g stated above and practice the long-term EBITDA margin I have 
projected for the company of 41%. Afterwards, I estimate Depreciation as 97% of CAPEX, 
since I have a guidance for a steady state CAPEX for the company of 17% of Revenues and 
Depreciation has been in my model on average 97% of CAPEX. I also factor in the net 
working capital requirements growing at the sustainable growth rate, take out the CAPEX 
estimated as just mentioned in the end get the first FCF of my perpetuity. Table 4 on the left 
summarizes the estimations mentioned above. 
 
ZAP 
As I mentioned above, I value separately the 30% stake NOS has in African Telcom 
company ZAP. ZAP is a joint venture, held 30% by NOS and 70% by SOCIP – Sociedade 
de Investimentos e Participações, S.A. (wholly controlled by Mrs. Isabel dos Santos) which 
offers satellite Pay TV in Angola. ZAP has a leadership in terms of Portuguese-spoken 
content in the Angolan market, and has its own home produced shows. ZAP has innovated 
in the market also through the improvement of its set top boxes and the introduction of HD 
contents. Also, ZAP is the exclusive operator of sports premium channel, SportTV Africa. 
ZAP has seen its customers grow 70% in 2013, along with EBITDA growing 257% to 
€47.39m at end of the year exchange rates and for the first year turning a profit. Given 
ZAP strong presence in a considerably undeveloped telcom market, I expect subscribers 
growth rate to be very high, backed both by population growth in Angola as well as 
significant (still a very undeveloped market in this front) growth of Pay-Tv penetration, 
                                                     
5 Bing Cao, Bin Jiang, and Timothy Koller (2006) Balancing ROIC and growth 
Table 4 – Terminal Value 
Cash Flow (Post-2023) 
Source: NOVASBE Research 
Source: Company Information; 
Bloomberg 
Chart 1 – Sustainable growth 
rates and ROIC for Portuguese 































which below 4.2% in 2012. This customer base growth affects revenues on two parallel 
sources, one the usual monthly fee associated with providing Pay-Tv services; the other 
which differs from the usual business model – the sale of set-top boxes to its clients. 
Notice however that this should be a one-off revenue, selling the set-top box once, as they 
become new clients of ZAP. 
However, this growth should be accompanied with corresponding growth both in NWC 
capital requirements and CAPEX. I estimate the former to be 5% of yearly increase in 
revenues. As for CAPEX, according to information provided by NOS, it amounted to 6% 
and 8% of sales in 2012 and 2013. Although I recognize this number should increase as 
customer base grows, it should never reach a steady state that NOS CAPEX will, for 
example, the mentioned 17% of revenues. This is because ZAP business is a satellite 
based one, therefore the CAPEX it incurs in is driven by the rental of satellite “space”, in 
other words paying for the capability of sending out a signal out to more homes. It does 
not, however require any physical investment in network like the fibre in Portugal does, for 
instance. Therefore, I estimate CAPEX never to surpass 10% of sales. The margin of ZAP 
should tend in the long-run to the EBITDA margin of close to 40%, as this is the low-end 
average for satellite Pay-Tv providers in the market. All in all, in the following table I 




In order to discount them to the present, I firstly take the same risk-free rate as for NOS, the 
average yield on German 10-year Bunds, 2.63%. I consider the same rate because I am 
projecting the cash flows based on Euro-denominated inputs, therefore they should be 
subject to the return for a risk-free investment in that same rate; after translating future cash 
flows at the EURUSD forward curve (later in this topic, I will explain the additional exchange 
rate risk implied in this reasoning). Afterwards I estimate the cost of equity, through the 
CAPM, estimating a levered Beta for ZAP. For doing so, I took 6 listed African 
telecommunication stocks – Econet Wireless, Telekom Networks Malawi, MTN Group, 
Safaricom, Vodacom Group and Sonatel and graphed their excess returns against the 
MSCI World Index. After excluding the outliers based on the judgement of a 95% 
confidence interval on the Betas obtained, I de-levered those Betas at the respective 
company’s market debt-to-equity ratio and then re-levered the average Beta at ZAP’s target 
capital structure – 80% Equity, 20% Debt, as quoted by NOS’s guidance. This process 
yielded an equity Beta for ZAP of 0.83.  
 
Table 6  - Levered Betas 
against MSCI World Index 
Source: Bloomberg 
* Betas taken from weekly returns in the 









Source: NOVASBE Research 
Table 5 – ZAP’s Forecasted Cash Flow for two scenarios 
2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
EBIT 65.0 78.9 92.8 106.6 120.1 132.7
Taxes on EBIT 22.8 27.6 32.5 37.3 42.0 46.4
CAPEX 27.7 33.5 39.5 45.4 51.1 56.4
WC Requirements 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0
FCF (base case) 10.9 13.7 16.7 19.7 22.6 25.5
FCF (one-off depreciation) 9.3 11.7 14.2 16.7 19.2 21.7
Actual FCF 10.3 12.9 15.7 18.5 21.3 24.0
 
 








This Beta should include any form of systematic risk ZAP, be it originating from the 
cyclicality of their businesses or from their operational leverage. When looking at European 
telecoms counter-parts, they have on average a higher Beta against the MSCI World 
Index, as shown on the table to the right.  This evidence of lower systematic risk for African 
telecoms can, in my opinion, be explained two distinct factors. Firstly, the fact that the 
African Telecoms listed do not have fiber-to-the-home services included in their Pay-Tv 
offers, instead they services are offered via satellite or they are just mobile operators. The 
former businesses have a smaller need for capital expenditure and a lower share of costs 
are fixed as they do not need to invest as much infrastructure, which would account for the 
lower operational leverage. On the other end, as I obtained the Beta against the MSCI 
World Index, it may be that African telecoms are subject to the different business cycles 
than the markets which are more relevant to the that index – U.S., United Kingdom and 
Japan make up 74% of the index – being the former more affected by commodities shocks 
and Chinese imports than the latter, for instances. Therefore, I am comfortable with the 
lower systematic risk inputted in to my valuation of ZAP.  For a market risk premium equal 
to the one used in NOS’ valuation of 6.27%, I obtained a cost of equity of 7.9%.  
As for the cost of debt, given the scarcity of rating information and the shortage of 
comparables, I took Bloomberg’s market value derived cost of debt estimates for the same 
comparables I used to estimate the Beta – MTN Group, Safaricom and Vodacom – and 
obtained an average cost of debt 7.7%. All in all I obtained a WACC of 7.9%. This rate 
seems too low for a cable company in a frontier market, but the issue here is that the low 
market-driven risk of the company can be justified by the factors listed above: lower 
operational leverage and distinct business cycles than the ones captured by MSCI World 
Index; this makes up for a low systematic risk for a holder of a geographically diversified 
portfolio. However, in order to ensure the full capture of the risk of the company (and not 
exclusively the systematic one), I factored in a scenario into my cash flow projection of a 
specific risk of the company – a one-off depreciation of the Kwanza against the dollar. 
Although the company incurs in costs both in Angola Kwanzas (AOA) and in dollars6, the 
Angola Kwanza is pegged to the USD by the National Bank of Angola (BNA), which usually 
ensures a stable value of the Kwanza. Currently, the currencies trades at 103 Kwanza’s per 
USD. However, we have witness a in the past, namely in 2008-2009 when the oil price 
dropped approximately 60% between July and December 2008, a loosening of the currency 
peg that allows the Kwanza to depreciate against the dollar - the Kwanza depreciated close 
to 15% in the first 9 months of the year. Given the currently low oil prices - Brent is at $56 
from $108 just 5 months ago - one must factor in the likelihood of a similar devaluation 
happening again. The charts to the left show how the Kwanza is yet to make a sizable 
devaluation to match the Brent price collapse. 
However, data suggest Angola is more resilient to oil price drops than it was in 2009. I base 
my assumption firstly on lower oil price expectations in public budgets (budget for 2015, 
currently being discussed in Parliament assumes an $81-year average for the Brent vs. $98 
in 20147). Secondly, the economy is more diversified, as oil sector accounts for 40% of the 
                                                     
6 The trend has been a decrease of the payments made in USD, as the BNA have been enacting “de-




































Chart 2 – Brent Price ($) 
and Kwanza/USD FX rate in 
’08 and ‘09 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Chart 3 – Brent Price ($) 
and Kwanza/USD FX  
 
 








country’s GDP, whereas it was 60% in 2008. Lastly, Angola’s FX reserves are, given last 
data available, at $28bn, which according to the Deutsche Bank should cover more than 6 
month of import. In 2008, they were below $20bn. Still, I factor in a scenario of a 15% cash 
flow devaluation, with 50% probability, as I do not have a particular view on oil prices 
going forward, and this depreciation was the yearly adjustment the Kwanza suffered 
against the dollar for a similar magnitude price drop in the Brent in 2008.  
I am, however, confident that this does not hurt my buy recommendation on NOS, has 
even for a virtually impossible scenario of a 50% depreciation of the cash flows originating 
from ZAP (one in equal degree as the adjustment verified in the last 6 months in the oil 
price), NOS’s fair value would decrease €0.05/share compared to my base case; still with 
an upside to its current price comfortably in excess of 15%. Assuming a long-term growth 
rate of 3.5% - quite conservative given that even in 2023 Pay TV market will hardly be 
mature in Angola the very least due to population growth; and that inflation rate has not 
been below 4% since 1990. I obtained an equity valuation of ZAP of €470m. Therefore, I 
value NOS’ 30% stake in ZAP at €141.1m or €0.28/share. I am also excluding from ZAP’s 
valuation a project that will sure be value-creating for NOS – ZAP’s announced investment 
in broadband network in Angola. I am confident it will be NPV-positive for NOS because it 
is exclusively financed with ZAP’s funds; and because the network investment will be 
made only in selected regions of Luanda, not in a widespread manner across country, 
which creates room for a region-on-region appreciation of the value-creation. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In this sub-section of my report I conduct a synthetic sensitivity analysis to the two most 
value-impacting inputs of my valuation on NOS, the weighted-average cost of capital and 





 The conclusions that this table allows to draw is that only under a scenario where the 
average cost of capital is above 10% and NOS grows in perpetuity at 0.5%, substantially 
inferior to the expected long-term inflation rate for a Euro-zone country does the target 
price of NOS for the end of 2015 falls below its current price of €4.95. This evidence 
further strengths my buy recommendation, as it suggests only in a scenario of very-long 
term stagnation for Europe and permanently high sovereign/cyclical risk associated with 
Portugal would NOS fail to produce a upside for its holder. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 Deutsche Bank Research 
7.0% 8.0% 8.7% 9.5% 10.5%
0.5% 7.43 6.47 5.94 5.44 4.92
1.0% 7.81 6.74 6.16 5.60 5.05
1.5% 8.27 7.05 6.39 5.79 5.19
2.0% 8.82 7.41 6.68 6.00 5.34
2.5% 9.48 7.84 7.00 6.25 5.52
Table 7 – Sensitivity analysis for the WACC and long term g 
Source: NOVASBE Research 
(1) Analysis is done for the Base Case Scenario valuation 
 
 










NOS is a cable and telecommunications company that offers Pay-Tv, broadband, fixed voice 
and mobile services in the Portuguese market. Its activities also include the cinema 
distribution and exhibition as well as content creation and sale through NOS-owned Pay-Tv 
channels. 
Brief History 
NOS’ origins date back to 2007, when the market incubent Portugal Telecom spinned-off its 
subsidiary PT Multimédia, which included the called TV Cabo operations and overall was the 
main materalization of Portugal Telecom’s effort to implement multi-media strategies. Since 
its inception and renaming as Zon Multimédia in 2008 as a completely independent body from 
the incumbent firm that NOS has been the leader in the Pay-Tv market.  It also became the 
first internet operator to offer broadband services to its costumers. More recently, in 2013, 
Zon Multimédia merged with Optimus to form Zon Optimus which was one year later re-
named NOS. 
Optimus was a mobile, broadband and voice operator of telecom and media company 
Sonaecom. When Optimus integrated Clix in 2010 it became the first operator to fully 




The Telco business is the core activity of NOS. This business unit includes the Pay-TV, 
Internet and voice services, both fixed and mobile, offered by NOS in Portugal.  
NOS offers bundles of the services above that range from duple play “NOS Dois” with Pay-
Tv and 1 mobile SIM card for €29.99, to its premium offer “NOS Cinco”, priced at €79.99 
since July in a promotional manner that includes not only mobile, Pay-Tv, fixed voice and 
broadband but also 5GB of mobile broadband. However, the offer that most likely 
contributed to the commercial performance of NOS in the Telco sector this past quarter was 
the creation of a lower pricing point convergent offer – “NOS Quatro Light”. For €49.99, 
customers get a lower end Pay-Tv package (126 channels), 30 Mbps in fixed internet, 
unlimited fixed voice and a single SIM card. Overall, NOS has a portfolio of offers for wide 
range of customers, from premium to discount (distinguished by amount of channels, 
internet speed and number of SIM cards8).  
Still, NOS’ Pay-Tv offer has some differentiation power over its competitors since the IRIS 
service was the first to have a “time-warp” function that automatically records the 
                                                     
8 NOS offered for the first time this quarter a 4Play offer priced at €49.99, “NOS Quatro Light”. This 
bundle has lower internet speed, but it now matched Vodafone’s price range. Broader description of 
pricing is done on the segment “Competition” of this report 
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Revenues EBITDA Margin
programming from the past 7 days. NOS’ IRIS and Kanguru (Optimus mobile broadband 
service prior to the merger) were also awarded product of the year in their categories by an 
independent entity. 
NOS had, as of 3Q14, approx. 300 thousand convergent customers, representing already 
24% of its Pay-TV subs. As for mobile, NOS has approx. 3.5 million subscribers. 
Note however that the Telco business unit includes the business segment as well, both for 
small and medium enterprises and for large corporate accounts. Business RGUs as a whole 
grew over 6% on year-on-year basis in 3Q14, totalling 1023 thousands RGUs. This can be 
mostly attributed to a higher commercial spending on this front, a better integrated offer and 
an increasing geographic coverage. As far as large corporate clients are concern, as I 
mentioned in my 3Q results preview and post-view, NOS has made a considerable progress 
by snatching from the incumbent Portugal Telecom the larger accounts in the market – 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, BPI and the Ministry of Health are some examples of NOS 
achievement in this sector. In a further section of this report I discuss the profitability 
potential impact of these contract on NOS’ financial performance. The graph below 
summarizes this business unit in the past quarters. 
 
As shown above, in most recent quarters NOS has struggled with revenue growth, essentially 
due to the aggressive pricing by Vodafone in its fixed bundle offers. However, as NOS 
becomes increasingly more integrated, the EBITDA erosion effect has been mitigated in the 
last 2 quarters. The numbers that better illustrate NOS commercial rebound is the decrease 
in Pay-Tv customer losses, as well as the gain in market share in mobile services in 2014. 
Overall, these provides a better outlook going forward, as NOS convergent offer is paying off. 
Chart 4 – Telco Business Unit quarterly Revenues, EBITDA (€m) and Margin (%) 
Vodafone’s aggressive 
pricing hurt NOS Telco 
performance… 
NOS has 300k convergent 
customers in 3P&4P offers 
And over 1 million business 
RGUs 
Source: Company Information 
 
 










 Cinema and Audiovisuals 
The cinema and audio-visuals business unit includes the cinema exhibition and distribution 
in Portugal, Spain and Mozambique; the sale of Pay-Tv and video-on-demand content 
rights. 
Currently, NOS has a 63% share of box office revenues in Portugal, according to the 
Portuguese Institute for Cinema and Audiovisuals, selling close 2 million tickets in 3Q14 at 
an average revenue per ticket of €4.7. NOS cinema exhibition segment has now 214 
screens in total, with the addition 5 screens in Forum Algarve. Noteworthy is also the 
opening of the first IMAX screens in NOS cinema in 2Q13, which has 148k customers to 
date. Still, this is a segment in clear decline with revenues falling 20% on year-on-year 
basis in 3Q14. As for the audiovisuals segment, NOS has a home video market share of 
59% and 57% for the cinema distribution. The leadership NOS holds in the cinema 
distribution market is further illustrated by NOS having distributed 6 out of the 10 most 
successful screenings in 3Q14. Also, the movie & series channels that NOS offers as a 
content seller have over 500k subscribers, 60% of which in Africa. The audiovisuals 
segment was flat this quarter, continuing this no-growth trend already exhibited in past 
quarters. The table below summarizes the recent performance of this unit. The company 
attributes the 20% y-o-y decline this past quarter to the absence of blockbusters - in 3Q13 
the movie “The Gilded Cage” was being displayed. This movie was a great success, 
selling over 2x times the tickets sold on 3Q14 most viewed movie, “Lucy”.  Yet this is 
evidence of a structural decline in this sector as I will showcase in our market overview 
section below. Also, if we take into account the volume added from the 5 new screens 
added, then total ticket sales actually declined 25% y-o-y in 3Q14. 
… But there is evidence 
of commercial rebound 
in 2014 
10.1 12.8
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NOS Cinema exhibition 
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Chart 5 – Pay-Tv Net Losses and Mobile Net Additions, in thousands of subscribers 
Source: Company Information 
Chart 6 – Audiovisuals Business Unit quarterly Revenues, EBITDA (€m) and Margin (%) 
Source: Company Information 
 
 










 The most prominent shareholder is the ZOPT holding that owns a majority stake of 
50.01%. ZOPT is a qualified holding that resulted from an agreement of its three controlling 
shareholders, Kento Holding Limited, Unitel International Holdings, both directly controlled by 
Mrs. Isabel dos Santos, and Sonaecom at the time of the Zon-Optimus merger. Therefore, 
Sonaecom holds an indirect share of 25% in NOS, along with a direct stake of 2.14%. The 
other reference shareholder currently holding a qualified stake in NOS is BPI, with 4.52% 







Here it is also important to highlight the recent reduction in stakes by historically important 
shareholders for the company. In the past weeks, Controlinveste reduced its stake in NOS 
from 2.90% to 1.36%, having sold over 4.7 million shares. This is quite relevant because 
these shares are attributable to Joaquin Oliveira, a reference shareholder and board member 
not only for NOS but overall a major stakeholder in the Portuguese Pay-Tv business as a 
whole. This disposal of shares are in my view positive because the shares owned by 
Controlinveste created an overhang risk for NOS’ shares, as the intention by Mr. Oliveira to 
reduce his stake in NOS was fairly known in the market. The same risk was present in Joe 
Berardo’s stake, which he disposed of last summer, another very relevant shareholder in 
company’s history. I believe that these two disposals have been contributing to the positive 













     Chart 7 – NOS’ Shareholder Structure (1) 
Source: ANACOM; NOVASBE Research 
(1)  Aside from Controlinveste, because of its status as an important stakeholder in this market; the chart only includes stakes above 2% 
 
 











The telecommunications market has experienced a significant reduction in the past years, 
going from a €7.56bn market in 2009 to a €6.27bn market in 20139, which translates into a 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of -3.7% across that period. This is a particularly 
negative picture if we consider the telecommunications market fell at a faster rate than the 
GDP, which had a -1.5% CAGR for the same period, making the telecommunications sector 
weight in the GDP decrease. Yet, according to ANACOM, approximately a third of the 
decrease in the telcom market was due to regulatory reasons, that is, difference in what counts 
as telecommunications expenditure. However, that would yield a net CAGR of -2.4% for the 
sector, which is still worse than the performance for the economy as a whole. The following 
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Telecom Market (EURbn) as % of GDP
Source: ANACOM; NOVASBE Research 
     Chart 8 – Size of Telecom Market (€bn) in Portugal and its weight in the GDP (%) 
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Going forward, I expect the telecom to continue its downward trend, although at a much less 
steep rate than in past years, dependent on overall economic recovery. My belief stems from 
the fact that the more developed economies in the EU, have lower figures for telecom 
expenditure as % of GDP than Portugal, as shown in the following table. We can see that for 
instance, Spain, France and Italy, already in 2010 had fallen below the 3% threshold. And 
looking at the richer economies, the Scandinavian countries, for example, they actually are 
around the 2% mark. Therefore I believe the trend for the not-as-developed players in the EU, 
such as Portugal, is to see that weight of telecom expenditures in GDP decreasing. Overall, 
that would translate in a Portuguese telecom market experiencing a decrease of roughly 2% 
CAGR for the 14-20E period. 
 
On a more bottom-up approach, however, there are still some opportunities for a telco carrier to 
grow in Portugal, at least in terms of subscribers. In terms of fixed broadband penetration, for 
example, there has been a significant increase in subscribers in the Portuguese market - 
between 2008 and 2013, fixed broadband subscribers registered an 8.6% CAGR, as shown on 
the left.  And, looking at a European picture, penetration of fixed access to broadband still lags 
behind not only main European players and the EU-27 average considerably, but also 
peripheral economy peers. Greece is the only from selected countries that had a lower Pay-Tv 
penetration. This suggests that telecom operators in Portugal may continue to benefit from this 
increase in subscribers. Regarding Pay-Tv, the Portuguese market has also been 
experiencing growth in terms of subscribers. Since 2008, Pay-Tv subscribers grew at a 7.2% 




Note however, that although Portugal Telecom is the telecom incumbent in the Portuguese 
market, NOS origins are TV Cabo, which at the time was the only Pay-Tv subscriber. Thus, 
NOS is the historically leader in this market, where it has a 45% market share as of this 3Q14, 
according to ANACOM. Therefore, this increase in size of the market does not benefit NOS 
directly, and its focus should be more on up-scaling Pay-Tv subscribers to higher priced 
bundles for increase Pay-Tv subscribers in terms of volume, as elaborate in later stages of this 
report. 
As far as mobile sector is concerned, the penetration rate in Portugal are very high – according 
to Eurostat, Portugal as more than 1.5 mobile SIM card per inhabitant since 2010, but it 
continues to grow at approx. 1.7% annual rate in the past 3 years. Seen as they are already 
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     Chart 11 – Pay-Tv Subscribers in Portugal (thousands) 
Source: ANACOM 
Chart 10 – Portugal Fixed BB 












In spite of that, there is a more relevant trend in the mobile market according to ANACOM. 
That is the increasing preference of consumers for pre-paid “all-you-can-eat” contracts, with 
free calls and messages and higher levels of internet data. Pre-paid contracts were 29% of 
consumer mobile services in 3Q13 vs. 40% in 3Q14. Therefore, this represents an opposing 




Also, it is important to mention that there has been a significant chance in the way the Pay-Tv 
service arrives at consumer’s homes. Cable and satellite and loosing subscribers, and being 
increasingly substituted by fiber (FTTH, or fiber-to-the-technology). For example, this past 
quarter, subscribers for Cable and satellite decreased -2.9% and -5.8% on a year-on-year, 
respectively; whereas DSL and Fibre grew 11.2% and 29.8%, respectively. As of 3Q14, Fibre 
already represented 17.8% of total Pay-Tv subscriptions. The graph above better illustrates 
this trend. 
All in all, telecommunication sector in Portugal should experience modest decrease rates 
going forward, even under the assumption that the recovery in the economy as a whole is 
verified. Still, there are particular sectors, namely fixed and mobile broadband, where there is 
still room to grow in volume. Clearly, NOS financial performance will not be driven by an 
overall sector expansion. I believe NOS story going forward is more an issue of who better 
addresses the convergence trend in the market. According to ANACOM, in 5 years, 
convergence should represent over 30% of the telecom market, therefore leadership in 
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Competition 
NOS origins go back to once monopolist TV Cabo in the Pay-Tv segment, so naturally NOS is 
the dominant player in that market with a market share of 44.5%. However, in the recent 
segments for Fixed Voice and Broadband, the incumbent Portugal Telecom and its MEO-
named services take the leadership as shown below. Note that all the market shares below are 
as of 3Q14 according to ANACOM. 
 
 
    However, going forward, I believe that the most important market share to look at, is the one 
referent to bundle offers, as the trend in this market is to observe an increasing convergent 
offer (300k subscribers increase from 3Q13 to 3Q14). In graph to the left I show market shares 
for the bundles offers together (from 2 play to quintuple play). The incumbent once again takes 
the lead, but here it is also important to mention that PT was the first one to launch triple play 
and quadruple play offers (M4O), the latter in January 2013. At the time, the offer was clearly 
the most competitive in the market, and it translated into 172k convergent subscriptions in its 
first 7 months of activity, 40% of which were new customers. 
 
In terms of pricing, there is clear distinction in the triple play bundle offering Pay-Tv, Broadband 
and Fixed Voice. On one side, the two players who have been in these markets the longest 
(Pay-Tv, BB and Fixed Voice), PT (MEO) and NOS; and on the other side the companies which 
are still trying to gain scale, Vodafone and Altice-owned Cabovisão. The former price the 
mentioned triple play bundle at €39.99 during the first 24 months of their contract, whereas the 
latter priced them at respectively €25.99 and €24.99. Notice however that the length of that 
pricing offer for Cabovisão is only 6 months, as opposed to the 24 month length its competitors 
practice. This represents a 35% cheaper service offered by Vodafone.  
 
Vodafone’s (and Cabovisão’s) should not be interpreted, however, as an attempt to make 
overall prices go down via a war price. As identified above, there is a strong trend in the 
market towards convergence (offering all services, mobile and fixed, under a bundle). Looking 
at Vodafone’s client structure as illustrated above, there is a significant imbalance between 
mobile customers and fixed customers for Vodafone – market shares above provided by 
Chart 13 – Market share in Portuguese Fixed Voice 
Chart 16 – Market Share in bundle 
offerings in Portugal, % 
Source: ANACOM 
Chart 15 – Market share in Portuguese Pay-Tv     Chart 14 – Market share in Portuguese Broadband 
Source: ANACOM Source: ANACOM Source: ANACOM 













ANACOM translate that bundle clients are only 5% of mobile customers for Vodafone, vs. 17% 
for Portugal Telecom and 39% for NOS. Market share in bundle offerings stated above on its 
own illustrates Vodafone’s weakness in this sector. This constitutes a disadvantage to 
Vodafone, as it is a smaller player in the service to which the market should converge to in the 
future (bundle subscribers grew 10% y-o-y in 3Q14). Therefore, I believe Vodafone should 
only keep this aggressive pricing until it reaches a number of subscribers or market share (how 
many/much is the million dollar question) in this service that makes it a stronger player in the 
bundle market as well. Especially because, as I illustrate in the “Revenues – enjoying 
convergence” section of this report, Vodafone’s pricing is unviable for a triple play bundle. 
 
Still, Vodafone has, in December 1st 2014, introduced a caveat in their pricing. In order to take 
advantage of the 7-day automatic rewind service (called time-warp), a customer needs to pay 
an additional €4 a month for the rental of the set-top box that has that functionality. Thus, in 
order to enjoy the same services as a given customer would in MEO or NOS, a Vodafone 
customer as to pay now €30.99. This reduces the price difference from 35% to 23%. Still a 
material difference for the average Portuguese household. This adds up to the €1 increase in 
their headline price from €24.99 registered in July. Overall, in less than 6 months Vodafone 
offers the same services for €5 more, which can give some indication of future change to the 
actual headline price. I elaborate on the feasibility of Vodafone’s pricing in the section 
“Revenues – enjoying convergence” section of this report. In the other bundled offerings, that 
further include mobile services and mobile broadband, the pricing is very much in line across 
competitors. There are changes however in the number of channels and high-definition 
channels included in the packages as well as internet speed. The table below summarizes the 




Portuguese Telecom has been a very active sector in terms of deal flow this recent years. 
Following the Cabovisão-Oni deal and the Zon-Optimus merger in 2013, we have seen 
currently an intense speculation and concrete bids for Portugal Telecom’s business (which is 
currently an asset of Oi). Recently, there has been a breakthrough – Oi announced it accepted 
Altice’s bid for PT on December 5th, leaving the Apax/Bain consortium out of the race. 
 
In my perspective, this news should have a positive read across for NOS. Assuming the 
regulator approves Altice’s purchase of Portugal Telecom, we would see a shift in the 
competitive landscape of the Portuguese telecom market, as the number of player would go 
Bundle/Operator NOS MEO (PT) Vodafone Cabovisão
Triple Play ( TV+ Broadband + Fixed Voice) € 39.99 € 39.99 €25.99 (1) €24.99 (2)
Quadruple Play € 49.99 € 49.99 € 49.80 -                    
Quadruple Play (2 SIM cards) € 59.99 € 59.99 € 59.70 -                    
Quintuple Play (4P + Mobile BB) € 79.90 € 79.99 -            -                    
     Table 8 – Bundle Pricing for each operator, in €/month, as of December 1st 
Source: ANACOM 
1) Plus €4/month for set-top box with time-warp 












down from 4 to 3. This should prove positive for NOS as it strengths the likelihood of Vodafone 
easing its aggressive pricing policy in the near future as competitive pressure decreases. As I 
further elaborate below, the easing of pricing by Vodafone after 2015 is a key assumption 
implicit in my BUY recommendation and the Altice bid does make it more likely in my view.  
Especially in the scenario that is considered more likely by market participants – a regulatory 
enforcement of Altice to sell Cabovisão to Vodafone. As I argued in the sub-section 
“Competition” above, Vodafone needs scale in order to forgo its aggressive pricing. If it were to 
add Cabovisão’s customers, Vodafone would be closer to a subscriber base comfortable 
enough to a profit-making pricing - 14.1% share in pay-tv; 15.6% in fixed voice and 15.8% in 
broadband. Still, I consider that any outcome from Altice/PT deal is positive for NOS when 
compared to the competing bid of the private equity consortium by Apax/Bain were to win, the 
picture would be different as you still keep a market with four players and thus the same 
competitive landscape in the sector. 
 
Note however, due to the mentioned above or any other caveat imposed on the deal by the 
regulator, it should take at least 6 months for the deal to go through. For instances, 
Optimus/Zon deal had less overlap, as the first was essentially a mobile operator and the 
second an essentially fixed one and there were still regulatory interventions, especially as far 
as the network was concerned (Optimus was forced to honour its deal with Vodafone). The 
PT/Cabovisão deal has a higher overlap in terms of services – together, PT and Cabovisão 
would have 60.2% share in fixed voice, 55.2% in Pay-Tv; 52.1% in bundles and 48.6% in 
broadband. Thus, we should expect the deal to go through before July 2015. 
  
 On a parallel note, although closely related, there is the bid of Mrs. Isabel dos Santos, via the 
Terra Peregrin holding, to buy PT SGPS that is quoted in the Portuguese Stock Exchange. 
Before further developing this subject, it is relevant to make a distinction – PT SGPS, the 
company listed on PSI20 is a company which is not the same as the actual Portugal Telecom, 
Portuguese telcom market incumbent. The latter is at this stage viewed as a business unit of 
Oi (or the ex-future Corp Co.), whereas the former is simply a company with a 25.6% stake in 
Oi, awarded once the merger terms were renegotiated and the Rio Forte debt10, the precise 
security that lead to that re-negotiation of the terms of the merger. In that sense, what Mrs. 
Dos Santos is doing in practice is bidding for a 25.6% stake in Oi, and a possibility to prevent 
Oi to sell Portugal Telecom. Mrs. Dos Santos imposed a series of contingencies in her bid, 
being the main ones that PT SGPS would see its capital in the new merged company increase 
10% and also that Oi would stop its asset disposal program, involving the sale of the Portugal 
Telecom business and the stake in Unitel, an African Telecom company. However, as of last 
December 23rd, Mrs. Isabel dos Santos has withdrawn her offer for PT SGPS. The withdrawal 
was on back of the request by Portuguese securities’ regulator CMVM that Mrs. Dos Santos 
should match her offer with the last 6 months VWAP11, €1.94. The bid stood at the time at 
€1.36, and Mrs. Dos Santos decided to withdraw her offer. 
 
                                                     
10 Rio Forte Debt refers to a approx. €900m debt that PT contracted with the Rio Forte 
company/holding, a member of the failing Espírito Santo Group 
11 Volume weighted average price 
Pay-Tv Fixed Voice Broadband
NOS 30.5% 34.8% 37.8%
Altice 54.8% 49.3% 46.3%
VOD + CBV 14.1% 15.6% 15.8%
Table 9 – Market Share per 
segment (%) if Altice wins and is 
forced to sell Cabovisão to VOD 













Presently, there is a scarcity of comparable firms for NOS that operate in the same market. 
Altice is publicly traded but there are no multiples exclusive to its Portuguese assets, and the 
same story goes for Vodafone. And PT, as explained in the section above, is listed but it is 
holding-like company that controls 25.6% of Oi. Thus, and it should not be valued according to 
what it does not include, Portugal Telecom’s Portuguese business. Therefore I take instead 
comparables across Europe to provide a better comparison. 
 
Note, however, that NOS lies somewhere in the middle of what are considered (and valued 
as) Cable companies and Telecom Carriers. In the sense there are the firms that have the 
network that make broadband and TV arrive to each people’s house, firms like Ziggo or Kable 
Deutschland; and then there the classical Telco Carriers that provide mobile and fixed voice 
services. The issue here is that NOS is a mix of both, even more so since the Zon-Optimus 
merger. Although there has been a trend towards convergence on both sides in Europe as 
well, there are still relevant discrepancies. Therefore, in order to create a really comparable 
market multiple for NOS I created an equally weighted blended multiple between cable 
companies and Telco’s. The figures for all companies other than NOS are based on 
Bloomberg consensus.  
 
As it is observable, NOS trades at a considerable discount both in Price-to-Earnings and 
EV/EBITDA. Still, I would be reluctant to call out the cheap valuation of NOS. Firstly, NOS 
suffers from a Portuguese market discount – less coverage, less liquidity and ultimately a 
discount give the recent events in the economy such as the Espirito Santo Group ruin. 
Secondly, the discount is justified when you look at nearer-term growth expected for NOS vs. 
the blended compositor. NOS EBITDA compounded annual growth for 15E-16E is 3% vs. 
Table 10 – NOS Comparable Multiples Analysis [Prices as of January 6th] 
Source: Bloomberg; NOVASBE Research 
Last Market Cap EPS CAGR EBITDA CAGR Div Yield
Company Price EURm 2015e 2016e  15e-16e 2015e 2016e  15e-16e 2015E
Cable
Kabel Deutschland 112.2 9,930 39.1 30.9 26% 13.5 12.1 9% 3%
Ziggo 38.5 7,713 22.462 21.6 4% 1139% 10.8 3% 5%
Altice 61.2 15,148 593.7 92.7 541% 745% 7.0 9% 0%
Numericable 37.9 18,464 39.5 29.6 34% 11.4 11.0 1% 1%
Cable Median 39.3 30.2 30% 11.4 10.9 6% 2%
Telco
Telefonica 11.37 52,952.4 12.9 12.3 5% 5.9 5.7 3% 6%
Telecom Italia 0.8575 15,667.2 12.1 11.9 1% 5.0 4.7 -1% 2%
Orange 13.37 35,415.6 13.9 13.4 4% 5.3 5.2 0% 5%
Jazztel 12.58 3,227.7 30.5 21.1 44% 12.9 10.2 24% 0%
Iliad 193.8 11,323.7 27.4 21.6 27% 8.2 7.0 14% 0%
Telco Median 13.9 13.4 4.9% 5.9 5.7 8% 3%
Blended Multiple 26.6 21.8 17% 8.7 8.3 7% 2%
NOS 4.95 2535 18.8 17.1 10% 6.4 6.2 3% 2%
Premium/Discount -29% -22% -26% -25%
P / E EV / EBITDA
 
 








Source: Bloomberg Source: Bloomberg 
(1) ZON Multimédia prior to ZONOP/NOS Stock 
blended of 7%. As far as EPS growth is concerned, difference is equally significant 17% in 
blended composite vs. 10% for NOS. 
This proves to be more reasonable if we simply focus on the Telco companies. Looking at the 
latter, NOS actually trades at an 8.5% premium on EV/EBITDA 15E, despite higher growth 
prospects for the denominator. In the case of P/E, NOS does trade at a premium against the 
Telco carrier composite selected, but it seems to be justified on the back of higher expected 
EPS growth. Therefore, multiple wise, NOS is not far from being fairly priced. The issue is here 
is the lack of truly comparable firms – the Portuguese market is not represented on the 
comparables; and most firms are not a fully convergent company across mobile, broadband, 
Pay TV and fixed voice as NOS is since the merger. Thus, multiple valuation is rather limited in 
this case. 
 
Alternatively, we can look at the historical multiples of Zon (only Zon-Optimus since the 3Q13) 
and assess whether the stock it at a reasonable entry point or not. What we may conclude 
when looking for a 3-year period is that the stock is expensive, given it is 23% above its 
average EV/EBITDA for the period and 19% above its average P/E. However, this is ignoring 
the shift from a more cable-like company, seen also as a distributor of content; to a fully 
convergent player once the merger took place, offering both mobile and fixed services. This is 
evidence by that fact that if only consider multiples since the time of the merger approval, 
September 4th 2013, then its only 1% above its average P/E and actually 8% above its 
average EV/EBITDA, and most of this was gain in the last two weeks where the stock show 
considerable resilience when compared with the market’s performance. Therefore, we can 
conclude that from a multiple stand point, NOS is somewhat fairly priced.  
Chart 18 – NOS Multiples in the last 3 years (1) Chart 17 – NOS Multiples since September 2013 (Merger) 
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Revenues – enjoying convergence 
 Consumer Telco 
I believe that NOS will continue to benefit from its success in placing its convergent 
quadruple play offer in the market, despite Vodafone’s aggressive pricing. Firstly because 
there is evidence that NOS is performing better in its convergent offer in most recent 
quarters, as I illustrated in a graph above – Pay-Tv have decrease significantly in past two 
quarters, and Mobile net additions have increase from negative in 4Q13, to over 138k in 
just 3 quarters. This figure translated into a 70 bp basis point gain in overall mobile 
subscribers’ market share according to ANACOM. 
 
Source: Company Data 
 
Also, mobile portability request in favour of NOS have been net positive al throughout 
2014, as shown on the figure to the left, which means there is a taking-up of the quadruple 
play bundle.  
As I explained in the market overview section, the telecom market is not in for a growth 
story going forward in Portugal. Therefore, the issue here is who will emerge as a dominant 
player as the market shows a clearly trend towards convergence. Although Vodafone is 
making considerable progress in terms of subscribers due to its pricing (€25.99 for its 
quadruple play bundle, recently increased from €24.99) I estimate that Vodafone actually 
loses money in each new customer they earn at that price.  
The network payment under ADSL is regulated by ANACOM and makes Vodafone pay PT 
for the use of its network €8.7 per household, whereas for Fibre (FTTH, that is, Fibre-to-
the-home) it is Vodafone which has to incur in the investment – not only the fibre cabling 
to get to a certain area but then also the OTH equipment needed to make the fibre reach 
the floors above ground, which I estimate to add up to €450 per customer, divided by the 
24 month duration of the contract I arrive to the €18.75 on the following table. Although the 
Chart 19 – Pay-Tv Net Losses and Mobile Net Adds (Thousand subscribers) 
Chart 20 – Net Mobile Number 
Portability (Thousands/Week) 
10.1 12.8
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Source: NOS; NOVASBE Research Source: ANACOM; NOVASBE Research 
fiber represents an investment that is then reusable for possible extension of the contract, 
unlike the network rent to be paid to PT, it must be made upfront, therefore takes a more 
material toll in Vodafone’s cash flows than the latter. Also, programming costs are the 
content and setting costs for the channels given on a quad play bundle to a customer. The 
number I came up with is on the low range of NOS’ estimations of said costs. For 
Vodafone, the number is likely significantly higher because Vodafone should have a lower 
bargaining power on this end, since it is only approximately 150k fixed customers. Lastly, 
there are termination fees on the case of the ADSL network, but for both cases one must 
consider also the rental of set top boxes (which Vodafone offers in its contract) which 
should account for at least €4.2 per customer. Overall, a broad picture for Vodafone’s 
triple play bundle cost structure is explicit on the figure to the right. 
Overall, we have that Vodafone actually loses almost €6 on every new customer served 
via ADSL and close to €15 via FTTH. This is a rough estimate but excludes other material 
costs such as sales commissions or incremental costs for call centres (more customers, 
more calls, and higher headcount) so I am confident of the conclusion that this pricing is 
not viable for Vodafone, regardless of the euro-large margin for error. Also, there has 
been further evidence of the indication that Vodafone will increase its headline price from 
the current €25.99. Vodafone recently introduced a caveat into its pricing, where in order 
to enjoy the 7-day time-warp service, you must pay separately the rental of the set-top box 
that allows that function, costing €4/month. If you add that to the price 1€ price increase 
verified in July, it fair to argue that Vodafone charges €5 more for the same services than 
it did 6 months ago. This supports my case of a headline normalization after 2015. 
 
 
Therefore, I consider that Vodafone will not be able to practice this price at beyond 2015. 
Even if customers stay locked in these terms for 2 years for the quadruple play bundle, 
from 2017 onwards the competitive landscape should change. This translate into my 
projections of a loss in Pay-Tv market share by NOS until 2017, at increasing smaller 
rates given the trend already demonstrated in chart 15, but afterwards a stabilization of the 
same. The same reasoning can be applied to the implied ARPU on fixed customers. Once 
competitive pressure eases, NOS ARPU on each fixed subscriber may revert its trend and 
conservatively grow at the expected inflation rate. 
Even throughout the coming two years, in a context of loss of market share in the Pay-Tv 
market, because NOS is the Pay-Tv leader a current market share of 45.3% it still as a 
considerable base of customers for which it can up-sell towards fixed and mobile bundles. 
Table 11 – Vodafone Fixed 














Netw ork 8.7 18.75
Termination Rate 1 0
TV Programming costs 12 12
Set topbbox rental 4.2 4.2
Total Costs 31.8 40.9
VOD's Quad Play Bundle Price 25.99 25.99































This has been the case since during 2013, NOS quadruple play additions were 89% 
originated from already Pay-Tv customers. 
Overall, what I project is then that NOS revenues in the first years of my analysis grow at a 
very modest rate essentially due to the up-scaling of Pay-Tv customers towards mobile 
and fixed bundles but under the pressure of Vodafone’s pricing. But after 2016E/2017E, 
the ARPU for the customer with fixed assess and mobile can grow at the inflation rate as 
well and the market shares for Pay-Tv and fixed should reach a somewhat steady-state.  
In mobile, the gain of market share is actually occurring today already, and should 
continue to progress in terms of mobile subscribers along with an increase of ARPU due 
to the effect highlighted above of an increasing preference for pre-paid contracts. I would 
highlight that this is not significantly margin dilutive for NOS. For Vodafone and PT, which 
have a larger subscriber base in mobile, the margin dilution maybe significant because 
once the subscriber take-up a converging bundle, they get on average less then they did 
for a stand-alone mobile subscriber. Whereas for NOS, it is adding mobile customers via 
Pay-Tv (89% of bundle take-up originated from clients who were already Pay-Tv 
subscribers of NOS), so they are mainly new customers in mobile segment together.  
 
 Business Telco 
Another important side of my revenue story going forward is the corporate segment of the 
Telco business unit. Traditionally, ZON was not a very important player in the corporate 
segment - as of 2013, I estimate NOS had an approximate 15% share of a €2bn market of 
corporate clients12. However, what we have seen in the most recent quarter is that NOS 
has won very important large accounts in the corporate segment. Most notably, BANIF, 
BPI, Minister of Health, Águas de Portugal and Caixa Geral de Depósitos. This is very 
material for NOS not only because of the dimension of these contracts – the CGD contract 
for example is worth €30m revenues for a 5 year and typically these contracts are renewed 
at least once – but also because accounts such as public administration and banks were 
“flagship” accounts for market incumbent Portugal Telecom, and they are to some extent a 
challenge of the reigning status quo in the telecom market context until quite recently. 
I am confident that this trend will continue to benefit NOS throughout 2015 (bearing in mind 
that often these large contracts and revenues are only realized 6-12 months later) on the 
back of three major factors. Firstly, it has clearly been a focus of NOS management 
recently to improve its business offering, as illustrated by the acquisition13 in 3Q14 of Main 
Road from Sonaecom. Main Road is a Portuguese data management and IT company that 
therefore brings not only added know-how for NOS corporate solutions offering but also 
complementary infrastructure such as two data centers, in Lisbon and Oporto.  
Secondly, the turbulence in PT helps NOS wins contract. Portugal Telecom is of today a 
difficult company to manage until the Altice purchase is done. It can incur in major strategic 
changes since it is about to be acquired, but until then it is an asset that Oi wants to 
                                                     
12 Source: ANACOM, Company Information 















1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14
Total RGUs ARPU per RGU (€)
Chart 23 – Revenue-generating 
units in business segment 
(thousands) and ARPU (€) 
Source: Company Information 
 
 








Table 12 – Revenues per business segment, EURm 
€m 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Telco 1330 1349 1353 1359 1411 1469 1533
Cinema & Audiovisuals 104 90 87 85 83 81 79
Others and Eliminations -44 -44 -44 -44 -44 -44 -44
NOS Revenues 1390 1395 1396 1399 1449 1506 1568
Source: NOVASBE Research 
dispose of, and so no less focus should be given to it on a management and operational 
level. Therefore, NOS is experiencing an unprecedented timing to collect major corporate 
clients from Portugal Telecom. Lastly, the Zon-Optimus merger made NOS a fully 
integrated player, capable of offering convergent products that include mobile solutions, 
probably the priority number #1 in the corporate context. Thus, the progressive integration 
of the two companies make NOS a much more capable of serving any company’s needs 
given its convergent offer. 
In the SME and SOHO, NOS has been gaining market share with RGUs growing over 6% 
year-on-year in 3Q14, having a total of 1.02 million RGUs. But on the other side of the 
coin NOS has been experiencing significant pricing pressure in the segment as shown on 
the right. 
 
 Cinema and Audiovisuals 
As for cinema and the audiovisuals, I predict a continuation of the structural decline 
verified in the past years in volume of tickets sold, and I do not believe on the IMAX’s 
power to effect the ARPU per movie-goer, at least on material level since it is already 
available for a year now, and it is yet to impact positively said ARPU. Therefore I expect 
average revenue per ticket simply to grow at the expect inflation rate. 
 
 
Taking all of the above into consideration, the following table summarizes my projection 
for firm’s revenues: 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Table 13 – Forecasted EBITDA, EURm and margin (%) 
Source: NOVASBE Research 
 
EBITDA – Synergies should allow margin 
improvement  
My projection of EBITDA relies heavily on a margin improvement going forward on the back 
of significant operational synergies from the Zon-Optimus Merger. It is important to note 
that I expect these synergies to reflect exclusively on the Telco business unit, as I do not 
project any synergies in the Cinema & Audiovisuals unit. 
 
The operational synergies are clear from a logical stand point – commercial costs should 
be lower under a single brand; SG&A should decrease as well via lower rent and leasing 
costs on real estate and offices used by the combined company; and overlap of corporate 
functions such as sales team, help centers and back-offices is also viable. The issue here 
is how big they are.  
 
In a first stage, NOS projected €50-60m synergies, later changing to a more ambitious 
target of €80-90m, pointing circa 30% of those to be operational. In order to assess the 
reasonability of this OPEX synergies, I compared its weight in total OPEX, which yields 
approximately 5%. I believe this figure is sensible since, looking at similar acquisitions that 
have happened recently (between a more cable-focused firm and a mobile operator; 
Vodafone/Kabel Deutschland deal especially) they have provided similar guidance, as I 
show on the figure to the left. 
 
Thus I project EBITDA margin improvements in-line with OPEX savings of 5%, which yields 
me evolution of EBITDA margins to the right, with a stabilization of the latter at 41% in the 
longer-term. I believe this is a good threshold seen as that was the margin practiced by the 
incumbent in the past (40.5% in 2013), and in a context of a shrinking sector, I would not 
expect NOS to surpass the best EBITDA margins practiced in the recent history of the 
sector. Taking into account company guidance, the projected OPEX savings come 
approximately 53% from staff costs, 20% from content costs (for instances TV 
programming costs) and 27% for commercial costs and business logistics.  
There is, however, a downward force as far as EBITDA margins are concerned originating 
from the large corporate accounts that I expect NOS to won in the near future. NOS 
investor relations team guidance was that NOS had to bid quite aggressively to win the 
major CGD and BPI contracts from Portugal Telecom, and margins should be 2/3 than 
those practiced in the consumer side of the business, putting them on the 25-30% range. 
As the volume of sales originating from these large corporate accounts rises, this may be a 
downward pressure on EBITDA margin. 





2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E
€m 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
EBITDA 511 523 540 572 592 615 641








Chart 25 – OPEX Synergies as 
% of combined OPEX 
Source: Company Information; 
Berenberg Research 
Source: NOVASBE Research 












Table 14 – Forecasted CAPEX, EURm and in % of Revenues 
Source: NOVASBE Research; Company Information 
 
Cash Flow Generation 
 CAPEX stabilization from 2017 onwards 
NOS will incur in very significant CAPEX this year and in 2015 due to an expansion of its 
household coverage in roughly 400k households. This will make total CAPEX reach its 
peak this year and the next, at an estimated €320m and €330m, respectively. Gradually, 
this figure should be reduced until it reaches a steady-state in 2017 of €245m yearly, as no 
major non-recurrent CAPEX investment is on the horizon; or alternatively at approximately 
16-18% of revenues. 
This figure however implies significant network-related synergies associated with the 
merger, being the most important the €10m/year savings relative to the mobile virtual 
network operator (MVNO) deal struck between Zon and Vodafone. As the contract ended 
in 2013, ZON renegotiated a similar deal with Optimus instead, stopping the cash from 
leaving the NOS group. 
Overall, NOS guidance suggests a re-run rate of CAPEX synergies of close to €60m, being 
distributed as follows: 29% in MVNO and Fibre contracts migration to Optimus; 37% 
savings directly related with redundant network investments and lastly 34% to 
infrastructures for information systems and information technologies. In their Frankfurt 
roadshow, NOS push the timing for IT integration synergies to only be significant on NOS 
accounts in 2015. Overall, I incorporate the company’s guidance as given until 2019E, and 
from then onwards I estimate CAPEX at the lower end of percentage of revenues long-term 
rate. Which yields the following: 
 
 
It is equally important to take note of the networking capital requirements. As no slump 
increase in demand is expected, but rather a gradual on the services provided due to the 
reasons stated in the section “Revenues – enjoying forecast”; I estimate networking capital 
requirements to grow proportionally to COGS, sales and inventory. Hence, I forecast future 
inventories, trade receivables and trade payables based on the historical behaviour of days 
in receivables, days in payables and days in inventories in the company. 
 
 What to do with the cash – substantial shareholder 
remuneration on the horizon 
The firm’s main focus as stated in its 2014 strategy day is domestic market share growth via 
the full integration of Zon and Optimus and a fully convergent operator. Given the picture 
2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Total CAPEX 318 329 265 245 245 255 245
as % of revenues 23% 24% 19% 18% 17% 17% 16%
 
 








that I have painted in the sector outlook of this section (especially given the recent 
announcement that Altice’s €7.4bn offer to buy PT Portugal has been accepted by Oi), I do 
not foresee much space for M&A activity in the near future: I do admit the possibility that 
NOS may incur in acquisitions such as the one for Mainroad, as they can be comfortably 
accommodated by NOS’ cash in the balance sheet and do not require any debt or equity 
issuance and they still help to earn market share. However, in a more consolidated market 
with just three players I do not expect NOS to incur in major acquisitions. Also, NOS 
management stated it would be unlikely for them to increase the stake in ZAP or look for 
further growth opportunities in Africa via acquisitions, therefore I am confident that neither 
M&A nor international expansion will be the primary goals for the cash inflow I estimate for 
the company – FCF growth of 24% for 16E-18E. 
 
Thus, in my opinion the cash generated by the company in coming years will be directed 
towards shareholder remuneration. In a no M&A scenario, NOS could pay dividends in 2016 
of as much €0.27/share without ever surpassing what I consider to be a steady level of Net 
Debt/EBITDA of 2.0x. This scenario would mean a distribution equivalent to a 6% dividend        
yield at NOS’ current price. 
 
 Lower cost of debt as a trigger 
Going forward I expect NOS to lower its cost of debt, and consequently have lower interest 
expenses which will allow for better cash flow generation in the future. My belief is firstly 
based on the refinancing activities NOS has undergone in 2014. In 2Q14, NOS completed a 
bond issue for €100m with a 5.5 year term along with a €175m bond issue in 3Q14, both 
done together with the early redemption of previously existing bonds transferred from 
Sonaecom to NOS once the two companies merged. Although the latter was a private 
placement, given some colour provided by the firm, estimate it to be close to 3.10%. 
Overall, these two refinancing deals have had a material impact in the average cost of debt 
incurred by NOS, and it also pushed the average maturity to alter in time, as is illustrated in 
the figure to the left – the average cost of debt for the first 9 months of 2014 stood of 5.05% 
vs. 5.58% in the end of 2013. This improvement can be attributed both to an overall 
improvement on financing conditions in the Portuguese market [see chart 28], and also to 
the better prospects of cash flows as the two firms were integrated successfully. 
Although the cost of debt does not directly affect the unlevered free cash flows used in my 
valuation for the company, a lower cost of debt make obligation to bondholders more likely to 
be honoured, and therefore make NOS’ equity less risky (recalling the residual nature of 
Equity, E = EV – D). I am, consequently, confident that further refinancing deals can be a 
positive trigger for the shares throughout 2015. This is backed by the fact that NOS has €372 
million euros of bonds and loan due in 2015, and if NOS continues to refinance itself at the 
rates secured on the placements mentioned above, there can be material changes to the 
cost of debt. For instance, I estimate that a 50 basis point decrease on the amount of debt 
due in 2015, would decrease my cost of debt by 12 bps.  
Chart 27 – Reported average 
cost of debt (%) and average 
debt maturity in years 

























Source: Company Information 














In this section I attempt to model the more material scenarios that would change the fair 
value of the stock and factor in those scenarios into my valuation for NOS. Firstly, I 
consider the scenario of the regulatory approval of the Altice/PT deal happening in the first 
semester of 2015, but under an imposition of Altice to sell Cabovisão to Vodafone, 
triggering a headline price increase in Vodafone. As mentioned above, I find this quite 
unlikely due, firstly, to the expected length of regulatory assessment – the Zon/Optimus 
deal took 8 months to be approved, and the deal had considerably less overlap than this 
one – and secondly because the deal (and consequent increase in fixed service market 
share for Vodafone) approval does not oblige Vodafone to increase its headline price 
immediately.  
Under this scenario, the pressure of Vodafone’s pricing would have fade sooner when, so I 
would expect to see a better ARPU performance in 2015 and 2016 (on back of less 
customer entering through the lower end bundles, such as or the existence of less 
promotions). Also, the trend of declining Pay-Tv losses should accelerate or possibly 
disappear under equal pricing. Consequently, Revenues for the 15E-17E would increase, 
but would expect similar margins on EBITDA.  
 
On an opposing side, there is the hypothesis that Vodafone keeps this price beyond 2015, 
despite the clear evidence that the price is unviable, as shown in section “Revenues – 
enjoying converge” of this report. This event is the major risk to my fair value, and it could 
be triggered by the regulatory dismissal of the Altice/PT deal (under a 4 player-market, 
there is higher competition) or simply by a choice of Vodafone’s management to achieve a 
higher scale of subscribers before easing pricing pressure.  
Although I find this event more likely than the positive scenario described above (because 
the latter requires an immediate response by Vodafone), I still believe it is a far picture of 
reality – VAT, programming costs and network alone make Vodafone lose money on each 
customer it adds at this current price, not even accounting for any sales commission, 
increased customer support costs and other. Therefore, it is unreasonable assume they 
can pursue this pricing for an additional two years (Vodafone’s London management 
should have its stop-and-loss threshold as well).  
 
Having described both scenarios, the tables on the left describe the changes to inputs 
made under those hypothetical circumstances, along with the consequences on the 
company’s financial performance, and lastly, its fair value per share. Notice, however, the 
fair value stated for NOS’ stock in this report, already includes that those scenarios at their 
respective probability. I estimate the first scenario where Vodafone increases its headline 
price still during 2015 to have a 5% chance of occurring, whereas the scenario where 
Vodafone extends its current pricing beyond the end of this year as, in my view, a 10% 
chance of occurring. 
 
EURm EBITDA 15E EBITDA 16E EBITDA 17E
Base Scenario 565 582 606
Bad Scenario (1) 552 551 564
Good Scenario (2) 567 603 637
 
Table 15 – EBITDA Forecasted 
under three scenarios 
 
Table 16 – Share Price under 
three scenarios considered 
Source: NOVASBE Research 
Source: NOVASBE Research 
Note: The target price above 
excludes dividend payment 
Share Price (€) Probability
Base Scenario 6.39 85%
Bad Scenario (1) 5.55 10%
Good Scenario (2) 6.98 5%
Final Target Price 6.34
 
 








EURm 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Cash and cash equivalents 41 41 41 41
Net Account Receivables 377 385 390 405
Inventories 52.6 53.8 54.4 56.6
Taxes receivable 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Prepaid expenses 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 523.3 533.2 538.5 555.9
NON - CURRENT ASSETS
Deferred Taxes 138.4 138.4 138.4 138.4
Investment in Group Companies 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.9
Intangible assets 1,158.3 1,158.3 1,158.3 1,158.3
Tangible assets 1,092.5 1,021.7 941.4 873.2
Other non-current assets 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4
TOTAL NON - CURRENT ASSETS 2,446.5 2,375.7 2,295.4 2,227.2
TOTAL ASSETS 2,969.8 2,908.9 2,834.0 2,783.0
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
Short term debt 235.2 242.1 247.7 252.3
All accounts payable 484.7 495.8 501.8 521.4
Accrued expenses 154.3 154.3 154.3 154.3
Deferred income 0.0 0.0 0.0
Taxes payable 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8
Current Provisions and other liabilities 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 893.5 911.6 923.3 947.5
NON - CURRENT LIABILITIES
Long-term debt 955.2 983.0 1,005.9 1,024.8
Provisions for other liabilities and charges 197.2 203.0 207.7 211.6
TOTAL NON - CURRENT LIABILITIES 1,152.4 1,185.9 1,213.5 1,236.4
TOTAL LIABILITIES 2,045.9 2,097.5 2,136.8 2,183.9
SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY
Share capital 5 5 5 5
Capital issued premium 854.2 854.2 854.2 854.2
Ow n shares (9) (9) (9) (9)
Reserves, Retained Earnings and other 126 126 126 126
Net Income 62 62 62 62
EQUITY BEFORE NON - CONTROL. 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038
Non-controlled interests 10 10 10 10
TOTAL EQUITY 923.862 811.326 697.149 599.068
EURm 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
REVENUES 1425.6 1458.4 1476.1 1533.7
EBITDA 565.1 583.0 603.4 645.4
Depreciation 336.2 335.8 325.2 313.3
EBIT 229.0 247.2 278.2 332.1
Financial costs -34.1 -34.8 -35.2 -35.5
Net Financial Result -56.3 -57.4 -58.1 -58.6
EBT 172.7 189.8 220.1 273.5
Income taxes 38.0 41.8 48.4 60.2
Net Income 134.7 148.1 171.6 213.7135.0912101 148.467 172.05 213.75
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NOS Income Statement 
 
 









Methodology for the cost of Debt 
Methodology used is available in Moody’s, under the document Moody’s Investor Service 
(2010) Rating Methodology - Global Telecommunications Industry dated from 2010. The sub-
factors that estimate the credit rating for NOS are both of quantitative and qualitative nature. 
The values for the quantitative factors are calculated based on 2013’s audited account, as to 
not be biased by my own estimations. After following the methodology of Moody’s, an equal 
weight was given to this score and to the average score for Portugal’s Sovereign Rating 
Baa1. The result yielded a credit score of NOS of 10.6, which translates into a Baa1 rating. 
The following table summarizes the score attributed to every sub-factor included in the model. 
 
Value Rating Score Weigth
Portugal Sovereign Rating Ba1 11
Debt/EBITDA 1.93 A 6 9%
FCF/DEBT 9.4% Baa 9 7%
RCF/DEBT 32.0% Baa 9 10%
(Ffo+Int.)/gross. Int 11.8 A 6 13%
(EBITDA-CAPEX)/Gross Int. 5.7 Baa 9 8%
EBITDA MG Baa 9 5%
Financial Policy Baa 9 5%
Market Share Baa 9 8%
Regulatory Baa 9 8%
Scale B 15 12%
Business Model, Competitive Environment B 15 15%
Score Baa3 9.96
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Research Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including dividends) of more than 15% over a 12-month 
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This report was prepared by Manuel Medeiros, a student of the NOVA School of Business and 
Economics, following the Masters in Finance Equity Research – Field Lab Work Project, exclusively 
for academic purposes. Thus, the author, which is a Masters in Finance student, is the sole 
responsible for the information and estimates contained herein and for the opinions expressed, which 
reflect exclusively his/her own personal judgement. This report was supervised by professor Rosário 
André (registered with Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários as financial analyst) who revised 
the valuation methodology and the financial model. All opinions and estimates are subject to change 
without notice. NOVA SBE or its faculty accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the content of this report nor 
for any consequences of its use.  
 
The information contained herein has been compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but NOVA SBE or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept no liability 
whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or its content. 
 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the subject company and its securities. He/she has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report.  
 
The author of this report may have a position, or otherwise be interested, in transactions in securities which 
are directly or indirectly the subject of this report. 
 
NOVA SBE may have received compensation from the subject company during the last 12 months related to 
its fund raising program. Nevertheless, no compensation eventually received by NOVA SBE is in any way 
related to or dependent on the opinions expressed in this report. 
 
The Nova School of Business and Economics, though registered with Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários, does not deal for or otherwise offers any investment or intermediation services to market 
counterparties, private or intermediate customers.  
 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published without the explicit previous consent of its author, 
unless when used by NOVA SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, NOVA SBE may decide to 
suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice.  
  
